Evolutionary Theory and Morality: Why the Science Doesn\u27t Settle the Philosophical Questions by FitzPatrick, William J.
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 44
Number 1 Volume 44 (2014) Article 2
2014
Evolutionary Theory and Morality: Why the
Science Doesn't Settle the Philosophical Questions
William J. FitzPatrick
University of Rochester, william.fitzpatrick@rochester.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the
Philosophy of Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
FitzPatrick, William J. (2014) "Evolutionary Theory and Morality: Why the Science Doesn't Settle the Philosophical Questions,"
Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol44/iss1/2
  
Evolutionary Theory and Morality:  
Why the Science Doesn’t Settle the 
Philosophical Questions1 
William J. FitzPatrick 
University of Rochester 
 
 
Four decades ago, E.O. Wilson famously declared that “the time 
has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of 
the philosophers and biologicized” (Wilson 1975, 562). Fortunately 
for those of us gainfully employed as philosophers working in 
ethics, not everyone listened.  Still, one finds Wilson’s idea echoed 
frequently in popular science writing today. Consider this passage 
from a recent article in The Economist, bearing the provocative 
headline: “Biology Invades a Field Philosophers Thought was 
Safely Theirs”. The author writes: 
Whence morality? That is a question which has 
troubled philosophers since their subject was 
invented.  Two and a half millennia of debate have, 
however, failed to produce a satisfactory answer.  
So now it’s time for someone else to have a 
go...Perhaps [biologists] can eventually do what 
philosophers have never managed, and explain 
moral behavior in an intellectually satisfying way.2 
While I’m not going to deny that  evolutionary biology and other 
sciences have important things to tell us about morality, in some 
sense, I think there is a lot of confusion about what exactly they 
can tell us, and how much they can tell us.  To begin with, we need 
1 This article derives from a lecture designed as a concise and 
broadly accessible presentation of ideas developed more fully in 
FitzPatrick (2008, 2011, and 2014a, b), and thus draws significantly 
from that work.  
2 “Moral Thinking: Biology Invades a Field Philosophers Thought 
Was Safely Theirs,” The Economist, February 21, 2008, accessed on 
August 29, 2008 at:  
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=
10717915.  
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to think carefully about what exactly we even mean by ‘morality’ in 
these discussions, and recognize the very different questions 
scientists and philosophers ask about it, often in rather different 
senses.  The above passage makes it sound as if there is a single set 
of questions that philosophers have raised and failed to answer, 
which will now thankfully be settled for us by evolutionary 
biologists.  But that is a confusion and it leads to a great deal of 
overreaching in the name of science, both by some scientists and 
by some philosophers who appeal to the science to advance certain 
deflationary philosophical conclusions about morality.  
My aim here is first to make some distinctions and sort out 
some issues, and then to examine one overreaching claim in 
particular, about the explanation of our moral beliefs by appeal to 
evolutionary causal influences.  That is a claim used by some 
philosophers to argue that evolutionary biology somehow forces 
on us either a skeptical or a purely subjectivist understanding of 
morality.  I will try to explain why I think this is misguided and is a 
poor use of science in philosophy.  
 
1.  First of all, then, what is the plausible part of the thought that 
animates people like Wilson and the author of that passage from 
The Economist? I think it is basically this: once we accept that natural 
selection has shaped not only the physiologies of organisms but 
also patterns of social behavior, in animals ranging from ants to 
chimpanzees, it is natural to suppose that there have been similar 
Darwinian influences on human nature as well: we should fully 
expect the human brain and mind to have been molded by social 
selection pressures to perform in ways that were adaptive in 
ancestral environments.  This then opens the door to rethinking 
traditional explanations of human cognition, emotion and behavior 
(Wilson 1978).  And in particular, we might wonder whether many 
phenomena falling under the heading of ‘morality’ can be freshly 
illuminated by approaching them from the perspective of 
evolutionary biology. 
Following Wilson’s lead, then, evolutionary psychologists view 
a wide array of psychological traits, including moral feeling and 
judgment, as culturally conditioned expressions of traits that have 
a genetic basis and evolved through natural selection.  Why, after 
all, do human beings have a capacity for moral judgment and 
motivation in the first place, which appears to be no less universal 
than our capacity for language?  Why do we experience emotions 
like sympathy, parental love, jealousy, resentment and guilt, and 
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cross-culturally make judgments condemning incest, unfairness, 
cheating, and in-group harming, or praising loyalty, reliability, and 
cooperation?  The suggestion is that these things stem ultimately 
from psychological adaptations—that is, dedicated (or ‘domain 
specific’) psychological mechanisms that originally emerged as 
adaptations for solving problems of social exchange faced by our 
Pleistocene ancestors, though they may or may not remain adaptive 
in current environments.3 
Again, I’m not going to deny that there’s some truth in that 
general idea.  But the conclusions that actually follow from the 
scientific work are likely to be much less flashy and more heavily 
qualified than the triumphalist talk of finally ‘explaining morality’ 
scientifically. So let’s start by looking more closely at what it even 
means to speak of ‘explaining morality’ scientifically, and the rather 
different concerns philosophers might have about morality in a 
somewhat different sense.  
 
2.  Another recent headline, this time from CNN, is helpful here. 
It asks: “Can morality be changed magnetically?” (Landau 2010)  
Now when philosophers hear this they just laugh, not because there 
is no interesting question here, but because whatever is meant by 
‘morality’ here is obviously not at all the same thing philosophers 
typically mean when they talk about morality.  A philosopher might 
ask, for example: “Does morality require that we make large 
sacrifices to aid distant strangers?” or “are there objective truths 
about morality”—moral truths about how we should live, or about 
the wrongness of bullying or rape or slavery, for example. Clearly 
we’re talking about very different things. 
The CNN story is about the effects of transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on the actual moral judgments people make.  So 
‘morality’ in that headline refers to certain empirical phenomena: 
namely, people making certain types of moral judgment under 
certain conditions. Apparently magnets can affect the judgments 
people make, and we can observe this phenomenon and study it.  
So the scientists are asking how certain empirical phenomena 
involving human thought and behavior are affected by certain 
3 Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992); Buss (2005); but for 
critiques of evolutionary psychology, see also Coyne (2000), Buller 
(2005), and Richardson (2007). 
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stimuli. 4  And more generally they ask questions like: which part 
of the brain is responsible for producing those phenomena, or for 
short: which part of the brain is responsible for ‘morality’?  
Similarly, when people ask ‘whence morality?’ as in that Economist 
passage, or speak of the ‘evolution of morality’, they’re asking 
questions about the causes of certain empirical phenomena.  They 
are interested in explaining how we came to have a capacity for 
moral judgment or a disposition to make certain types of moral 
judgment.  So in all these cases we’re talking about ‘morality’ in 
what I’ll call the empirical sense: morality as a certain set of empirical 
phenomena having to do with moral judgment, to be causally 
explained scientifically. 
By contrast, moral philosophers are not typically or primarily 
concerned with causal explanations of morality in the empirical 
sense.  When we speak of morality, whether we’re asking first-order 
questions about what morality requires of us, say, or second-order 
questions about whether there are objective truths about morality 
in that sense, we are speaking of ‘morality’ in what I’ll call the 
normative sense.  In this sense, ‘morality’ refers roughly to however 
it is we ought to live—that is, to a set of norms that ought to be 
adopted and followed, whether they actually are or not.5  This is 
4 The empirical finding was that when a certain part of the right 
side of the brain is disrupted, people give intentions less weight in 
moral judgment, focusing more on outcomes.  
5 Although I’m calling this the ‘normative’ sense of ‘morality’, not 
all questions about morality in this sense are normative or first-
order ones. The first question above (about what morality requires 
of us) is a normative one, but the second (about whether there are 
objective truths about what morality requires of us) is not: it is a 
metaethical or second-order question about morality in the normative 
sense, namely whether there are objective truths about what is good 
and bad, right and wrong. Another metaethical question involves 
the meaning of moral judgments. For example, when I say that 
morality requires us to help distant strangers, we might ask: am I 
expressing a belief with propositional content that can be true or 
false, or just a non-cognitive mental state? One might also construe 
this metaethical question as being about morality in the empirical 
sense: our moralizing is an empirical phenomenon, and we want to 
know what kind of meaning it has. But our concern here is not in 
any case with causal explanations of the empirical phenomena, and 
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not an empirical phenomenon to be causally explained, or 
something that might be affected by magnets.  To speak of morality 
in the normative sense is to speak of how we really ought to live, 
and this is what you’re doing when you say, as a committed moral 
agent, that morality prohibits bullying or rape, for example, or more 
simply that such things are morally wrong or immoral.  And 
philosophers likewise typically speak of morality in the normative 
sense, both when we’re doing first-order moral theory and when 
we’re doing second-order theorizing about the nature of morality.  
For example, when a philosopher gives a theory to justify the 
first-order moral judgment that bullying or rape are wrong, say by 
appealing to the Kantian idea that persons are ends in themselves, 
she is explaining why morality in the normative sense has a certain 
content; she is not causally explaining some empirical 
phenomenon.  And when a philosopher considers whether it is an 
objective truth that morality prohibits bullying or rape—an 
objective truth that these things are genuinely morally wrong—say 
by looking at the meaning of moral judgments and possible 
grounds of moral truth, she is likewise speaking of morality in the 
normative sense. She is asking whether there are objective truths 
about how we ought to live.  
 
3.  So we can distinguish between scientific explanatory projects 
having to do with morality in the empirical sense, and various 
philosophical investigations of morality in the normative sense. 
These are both valuable projects, but the question I’m interested in 
here is what relevance each might have for the other.  
The simplest point here is a familiar one I’ll mention just to set 
aside.  Scientific explanations of why we evolved to have certain 
dispositions obviously cannot settle first-order moral questions for 
us about how we should live.  For example, a strong disposition to 
philander appears to be a biological adaptation in male superb fairy 
wrens, among other species, and suppose it were established that it 
is also an adaptation in male human beings, which evolved for the 
same Darwinian reasons.  We might even imagine that we evolved 
a psychological disposition to adopt a double standard whereby 
male infidelity is regarded as more acceptable than female infidelity, 
what we’re interested in is specifically the meaning of judgments 
with a certain content—that is, judgments whose content concerns 
morality in the normative sense.  
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and this may have affected various cultural structures as well.  Even 
if all that were true (and it makes no difference to the present point 
whether it is or not), it obviously wouldn’t show that any of this is 
actually good or right, or give us good reason to act on that 
predisposition.  Such facts about evolutionary influences on human 
psychology and behavior wouldn’t have any normative or rational force 
for us today as we reflect intelligently on how it is good and right 
to live. 
Evolutionary facts may explain a lot, but they don’t justify 
behaviors or attitudes, and so they don’t answer moral questions 
for us.  They might of course have some relevance for our 
deliberations: we always have to deliberate in light of the facts of 
life, and evolutionary theory contributes factual information about 
human life, some of which may well be morally relevant. But it 
certainly doesn’t settle anything for us about what we should strive 
for.  So biologists shouldn’t (and typically don’t) purport to be to 
‘explaining morality’ in the sense of explaining the content of 
morality in the normative sense: that would amount to justifying a 
certain conception of morality in the normative sense, and biology 
can’t do that.  Such a thing still falls under the philosopher’s job 
description.  What biology may hope to do is to help explain at 
least some aspects of morality in the empirical sense.  
Here I want to focus on two main questions about the relation 
between biological and philosophical projects.  
(1) How do scientific explanatory projects bear on metaethics 
(philosophical thinking about the status of morality)—for example, 
questions about whether or not there are objective and knowable 
moral truths; and:  
(2) How might philosophical issues bear on scientific 
explanatory projects, perhaps imposing significant limitations on 
them?  
So let’s turn to those questions. 
 
4.  It is no surprise that scientists approach morality in the empirical 
sense, like anything else, as a set of empirical phenomena to be 
causally explained with scientific tools.  And there are two broad 
explanatory projects we need to distinguish here.  The first deals 
with the emergence in human history of basic mental capacities 
relevant to making moral judgments.  How and why did human 
beings come to have a capacity for normative (and ultimately 
moral) guidance?  That is, how did we come to be able to grasp and 
accept and internalize norms of social interaction and response, 
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making and being motivated by normative ‘ought’ judgments and 
ultimately moral judgments, with the help of reactive emotions 
such as resentment, blame and guilt?  Where did all of this come 
from? 
It seems clear enough that this calls for a causal explanation of 
a scientific sort.  Since we are evolved creatures, there is presumably 
some sort of evolutionary explanation for the emergence of such 
complex psychological capacities, just as with our linguistic 
capacies.  Philip Kitcher, for example, argues that the capacity for 
moral guidance or governance is a biological adaptation that 
evolved because it promoted social coordination: it helped to 
remedy altruism failures in ancestral humans, making possible 
cooperative projects in larger groups with more reliable 
conformity, which in turn enhanced biological fitness for members 
(Kitcher 2006a,b, 2011. Cf. also Gibbard 1992).  This is plausible 
enough and is in any case something moral philosophers should be 
happy to leave to biologists to speculate about (keeping in mind 
that it is indeed quite speculative).  Scientists can profitably take up 
these questions about the evolution of basic cognitive and 
emotional capacities independently of the concerns of moral 
philosophers because these really just are scientific questions about 
the origins of certain human capacities.  Scientists can investigate 
this without input from moral philosophers just as they can 
investigate the causal origins of the basic capacities that enable us 
to do math without having to engage in inquiry requiring a consult 
with mathematicians or philosophers of mathematics.6  
6 Among other things, scientists might debate whether the capacity 
in question is an adaptation or a by-product of other, more general 
adaptations.  There is also the closely related question whether the 
basic capacity for moral judgment is innate or not, with capacity (or 
faculty) nativists claiming it is (Dwyer 2008) and antinativists denying 
this (Prinz 2008).  This would just be the same question as before 
if a trait’s being an adaptation were essential to its being innate, and 
some take it that way.  But we might instead have a conception of 
innateness whereby it is sufficient for a trait’s being innate that it is 
a consistent and stable feature of the evolved package such that it 
will be manifested in normal development in virtually any cultural 
context—never mind whether it was itself selected for as such. In 
this sense, an underlying competence for morality might be innate, 
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Things get more complicated, however, when we shift to 
explaining not just the origins of the capacities we employ in moral 
judgment, but the causes of the particular moral judgments we make, 
or the contents of our moral beliefs as we exercise those capacities.  
I don’t here just mean complications stemming from the fact that 
our moral judgments or beliefs are conditioned by cultural 
influences as well.  Obviously that’s true: no one a hundred years 
ago made moral judgments about the morality of stem cell research 
or twerking.  Both the subject matter of our judgments and the very 
moral concepts we employ are often heavily conditioned by our 
cultural influences.  But evolutionary psychologists are well aware 
of that.  Their claim is going to be that despite the many cultural 
contributions, there are biological adaptations in the form of 
evolved psychological traits that have deeply influenced the more 
basic content of our moral feelings, judgments and behaviors.  In 
fact, these evolved psychological adaptations have also shaped the 
cultural developments themselves, so even those cultural 
influences already reflect deeper biological shaping.  
For example, a sexual aversion toward close kin likely evolved 
for obvious Darwinian reasons, and this universal psychological 
adaptation may explain moral sentiments relating to incest by 
influencing emotionally laden moral judgments about incest, which 
in turn influence behaviors relating to it.  Part of that behavior is 
the development of cultural norms and practices regulating incest, 
which will therefore themselves be partly steered by these 
Darwinian influences, perhaps in combination with other 
adaptations for “regulat[ing] the sexual behavior of one’s kin,” all 
mediated by cultural inputs (Lieberman, 2008).  So despite the 
complications of cultural inputs, evolutionary psychologists will 
still claim to find many Darwinian influences underlying much of 
the basic content of our moral judgment and resulting behavior.  
Maybe they haven’t fully appreciated the degree of cultural input 
and variation, as some social scientists (such as Joseph Henrich) 
have argued.  But my concern is with a different sort of 
complication. 
 
5.  It has to do with the fact that our moral judgments or beliefs 
are not merely things that are caused in us, the way human cognitive 
as opposed to a contingent cultural construction, even if it is not 
itself an adaptation. 
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capacities were simply caused to develop over evolutionary time.  
When you make a moral judgment or form a belief—for example, 
that racial or gender discrimination in voting or educational 
opportunities is wrong—this isn’t just something that was caused 
to happen in you, like a sneeze or a rash.  Our first question about 
it shouldn’t be: ‘what caused this judgment to occur in you?’, as if 
it were just any other empirical phenomenon.  As with other 
judgments or beliefs, when you make a moral judgment or hold a 
moral belief, you typically have a reason for it—a consideration you 
take to justify it, helping to show why it’s true, rather than just some 
factor that causally explains its occurrence in you.  If I ask you to 
explain why you believe what you do, you’ll give me your reason 
for holding that belief, which again functions as a justification, a 
kind of defense of your belief purporting to show why it’s true; 
you’re not merely citing something that caused it, like some dust 
that caused you to sneeze.  So if we want to explain your moral 
belief—why you believe what you do about the wrongness of 
discrimination—we should start by finding out your reason, i.e., the 
consideration you took to justify your belief by supporting its truth.  
We at least start with what is called a ‘reason-giving explanation’, 
as opposed to a merely causal explanation offered from the outside.  
The same is true for other beliefs, such as mathematical ones.  
If we want to explain why you believe that there are infinitely many 
prime numbers, for example, we don’t start by looking for physical 
causes or merely sociological influences.  We start by asking you 
your reasons.  When we ask: why do you believe that there are 
infinitely many primes, we mean: what reasons do you have for 
thinking this mathematical claim to be true?  And you’ll answer our 
‘why?’ question by giving your reasons, which amount to the 
considerations you take to justify your belief, supporting its truth.  
For example, you’ll cite Euclid’s famous proof, which you take to 
show that there are infinintely many primes.  
Now the point is not that morality is just like math.  The point 
so far is just that when we set out to explain beliefs—why people 
believe what they do—we cannot just start by casting about for 
causes having nothing to do with the truth of the content of the beliefs 
in question.  There may be some cases that are like that, where that 
is all that can be said: ‘Why does Oscar believe his hat is on fire?  
It’s because a hypnotist caused him to have that belief.’  And I grant 
that there are some cases of moral belief that are likewise just 
caused by extraneous factors, where the reasons people give for 
them are just what Jonathan Haidt (2001) calls “post hoc 
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rationalizations” rather than genuine explanations.  For example, 
someone might judge that homosexuality is evil, and this may just 
be an expression of his gut reaction of disgust when he imagines it, 
projected onto the world, and then he casts about for ‘reasons’ to 
rationalize his judgment after the fact. Such a thing is not 
uncommon.  But there is no good reason to think that this is all 
that’s ever going on when we make moral judgments, especially 
reflective ones for which we have plausible rationales that 
withstand critical scrutiny.  We cannot just assume that moral 
judgments across the board typically fit the merely post hoc 
rationalization model just because some plausibly do.  
In trying to explain someone’s moral beliefs, then, we should 
at least start by looking to the person’s reasons for holding the 
belief.  And the point is that this gets us to questions of justification 
and not just causation, since the person believes what she does 
because she takes a certain consideration to be a good reason that 
justifies the belief, by showing it to be true.  So we then need to ask 
whether she is right about that, and how she came to be right about 
that, or where she went wrong.  In the math example, those 
questions get us into substantive mathematics: we are not simply in 
the business of appealing to physical or sociological causes to 
explain beliefs about prime numbers, as when explaining a person’s 
sneeze or accent.  We instead need to consider whether the proof 
a person took to be a good reason for believing the mathematical 
claim really was a good reason or not, and why she took it to be.  And 
my point is that the same is true in the case of moral belief—or at 
least we can’t simply assume it is not.  
You believe, let’s suppose, that racial or gender discrimination 
in voting laws is wrong, or that bullying is wrong.  Why?  Well, it 
could be that a hypnotist arbitrarily caused you to have that belief, 
and that’s all there is to it. But ordinarily that is not how it is.  
Normally, you have reasons for your moral beliefs.  These might 
include the fact that race or gender are irrelevant to what matters 
to responsible voting, or the fact that bullying is cruel, causes 
needless suffering and misery, and is an afront to the dignity of the 
victim.  These reasons are things you take to be wrong-making 
features of discriminatory voting laws or of bullying.  So our 
explanation of your belief goes by way of your judgment that those 
things are wrong-making features and so good reasons for believing 
the moral claims in question, justifying them by showing why they’re 
true—why it’s true that discrimination or bullying are wrong.  We 
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don’t just cite external causes in the way scientists are accustomed 
to doing for other types of phenomena. 
Now why does all this matter? It matters because in philosophy 
there is a still very live debate about the status of moral judgments, 
with many—probably most—philosophers maintaining that moral 
judgments can be straightforwardly true or false, just like other 
claims: there are moral facts alongside other facts.  Of course, 
plenty of people are also skeptical about that, but never mind 
whether it’s ultimately correct or not: it doesn’t actually matter for 
my purposes here.  It is enough to recognize that it is at least an 
open philosophical issue, which means that one cannot simply 
assume, as a scientist, say, that there are no moral truths—that 
morality is all just a matter of subjective preferences, or expressed 
attitudes, or mere convention.  
Moral nihilism is of course one philosophical possibility, but it 
is hardly the default, and it is equally possible that there is truth or 
falsity in morality as in other things.  And the point is that if there 
is real truth in the moral domain, then that will likely make a 
difference to how at least some of our moral judgments or beliefs 
are properly explained, just as in other domains such as 
mathematics.  So the answer to this philosophical question will 
make a crucial difference to explanatory projects concerning our 
moral beliefs, even though our moral beliefs are observable, 
empirical phenomena.  That’s the key issue.  
To see this, return to math, where there certainly seems to be 
truth and falsity.  We don’t look to explain your belief about prime 
numbers simply by citing evolutionary causes or sociological causal 
influences, though of course they will be part of the story.  We cite 
primarily your reasons for holding the belief, and your judgment that 
these are indeed good reasons for holding it—good reasons to think 
there are infinitely many primes.  And this again isn’t merely a 
judgment you were caused to have by extraneous evolutionary or 
sociological causes, as by a hypnotist: you came to that judgment 
because you’re mathematically competent and correctly recognized the 
proof to be sound, entailing the truth of the proposition in 
question.  In other words, you believe that there are infinitely many 
primes because there are, and being competent, you’ve grasped that 
mathematical fact by grasping the reasons why there must be 
infinitely many primes.  In other words, the truth of the content of 
your belief is relevant to the explanation of it here: it’s not that 
extraneous causes operating independently of the truth of the 
content of the belief have merely pushed you to have this belief. 
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The point, then, is that the same thing may hold for your moral 
beliefs if there are likewise facts about morality, as many 
philosophers believe there are.  Suppose bullying is genuinely, 
objectively wrong, and is made wrong by the fact that it causes 
needless suffering and misery, and violates the dignity of the victim, 
as I’ve suggested. In other words, suppose it is an objective moral 
fact that these features of bullying are wrong-making, and that 
bullying is therefore wrong. And now suppose also that you believe 
that bullying is wrong.  We then ask: why do you believe that? 
Again, the ordinary explanation here will be a reason-giving 
explanation.  So let’s say you give as your reasons precisely these 
features of bullying, which you correctly take to be wrong-making 
features, and therefore good reasons to believe that bullying is wrong.  
The next question, then, is why do you believe that?  
Well, it could be that you just coincidentally happen to believe 
those things for reasons having nothing to do with their truth: you 
believe that causing needless suffering and misery is wrong-making 
not because it is, but simply because a hypnotist caused you to have 
that belief, or because evolution or sociological influences 
coincidentally caused you to believe it regardless of its truth.  But 
the far more natural explanation here—and the one you should 
find far more plausible if you take yourself to be a competent moral 
agent—parallels the explanation in the math example, again 
assuming for the sake of argument that there are truths about these 
things. You believe that bullying is wrong, I suggest, because it is 
wrong and, being morally competent, you’ve recognized that moral 
fact by grasping the reasons why bullying is wrong, correctly 
recognizing the wrong-makingness of inflicting needless suffering.  
This, in any case, is the kind of explanation many philosophers will 
give in cases like this.  And if it is correct (which is at least an open 
possibility), then the proper explanation of at least some of our 
moral beliefs—where we are getting things right for the right 
reasons—essentially appeals to our recognition of moral truths. In 
other words, the moral truths will come into the explanation of our beliefs.  
Now this is important because it obviously contrasts with 
scientific explanations of moral beliefs.  Scientists don’t trade in 
exotic items like moral truths or processes like someone’s grasping 
a moral truth by recognizing good reasons for holding a moral 
belief.  Those aren’t empirical categories.  And that’s fine, of 
course: I’m not saying scientists should talk about those things; 
that’s for philosophers.  What I’m arguing is that since the 
philosophical picture I’ve sketched remains a live, open possibility, 
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we have to keep that possibility in mind when approaching the 
question of how best to explain our moral beliefs.  
If nihilism were true, contrary to the picture I’ve just been 
exploring, then things would be simpler: the only explanations of 
our moral beliefs would be scientific causal ones.  Scientists could 
go ahead and give purely causal explanations of why we took 
certain things to be good reasons for holding certain moral beliefs 
even though they aren’t.  This would just be a matter of 
evolutionary and sociological influences, on the very same model 
as the one we would employ in explaining why a bigot takes takes 
the fact that a certain marriage is mixed-race to be a good reason 
to believe that it’s wrong.  If there is really no such thing as wrong-
makingness, then all judgments about it—whether your plausible 
judgments or the racist’s deplorable ones—will just be explained 
on the same model, by appeal to things like evolved instincts and 
cultural pushes and pulls this way or that way.  
As I have emphasized, however, nihilism is hardly the obvious 
default here, which means that scientists cannot just proceed as if it were 
correct.  The existence and nature of moral truth is a core 
philosophical issue, and nihilism is just one highly contentious 
philosophical position.  If nihilism turns out to be false and there 
are moral truths of the sort I’ve suggested, and we’re capable of 
competently grasping them, then that will plausibly be a crucial part 
of the best explanation for why we believe at least some of what 
we do morally speaking.  So if someone tries to explain why you 
believe that bullying is wrong simply by appealing to evolutionary 
or other causal factors that pushed you incidentally in that 
direction, with no appeal to your having competently grasped the 
moral truth that bullying is wrong by understanding the reasons 
why it is wrong, then that explanation may be fundamentally 
lacking, just as it would be in the parallel math case.  Indeed, if you 
are not a nihilist and are serious about your belief then you should 
feel rather insulted by such explanatory claims about why you 
believe what you do, which appeal simply to extraneous causes.  
Such explanations are ultimately more condescending than 
“intellectually satisfying” (as they are claimed to be in the Economist 
passage we started with).   
Of course, in the case of false moral beliefs, such as the belief 
that interracial marriage is morally wrong, there will be nothing but 
merely causal factors at work, since there was no relevant moral 
truth to have been grasped in those cases.  The explanations in those 
cases would look just like all explanations would under nihilistic 
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assumptions.  My point is that we can’t just assume that all 
explanations should look like that, across the board—at least not 
as long as it is an open philosophical possibility that there are moral 
truths and our grasping some of them has guided some of our 
moral beliefs.  And this has an interesting and perhaps rather 
surprising implication: if scientists are to avoid begging central 
philosophical questions, they cannot assume that all empirical 
phenomena admit of purely scientific causal treatment, as one 
might have thought.  Our having certain moral beliefs is, after all, 
an observable, empirical phenomenon, but under the philosophical 
possibility I’ve been describing, some of our moral beliefs won’t be 
explained fully and adequately by appeal to scientific causal 
explanations.  So if we are to avoid begging philosophical 
questions, as by just assuming nihilism, then scientific explanatory 
claims concerning our moral beliefs have to be put quite modestly.  
No scientist should claim to have ‘explained morality’ in the 
sense of explaining why you hold the moral beliefs you do.  They 
can reasonably claim to have identified some causal factors—many 
of them evolutionary—that have plausibly influenced many human 
moral beliefs to some degree.  But that is a far cry from revealing 
the causes of all our moral beliefs or showing that they are all 
morally blind.  And the same goes, incidentally, for religious beliefs, 
if scientists are to avoid begging theological questions that lie 
outside the scope of their inquiry.  
 
6.  Let me conclude by explaining briefly how I think some 
philosophers have missed these points and made overreaching 
explanatory claims in the name of science, which they have then 
tried to use to support deflationary metaethical views.  I’ll call these 
philosophers ‘evolutionary debunkers’.  Their aim is roughly to 
argue that there can’t be moral truths that are both knowable and 
also objective—in the sense of not being just a function of our 
contingent, subjective desires or attitudes.  If basic moral truths are 
objective, as many philosophers think, then according to the 
debunkers we could never know them, and so we would be stuck 
with moral skepticism. So either we can have moral knowledge but 
morality is all subjective, or we can’t have any moral knowledge at 
all (Street 2006).  And this is all supposed to be true because 
evolution is incompatible with our having justified moral beliefs if 
moral truths are objective.  Now why do they think that? Basically 
the argument goes like this (drawing here mainly on Street 2006, 
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though see also Joyce 2006 for related arguments for a different 
but related conclusion). 
Evolutionary biology, they claim, has deeply shaped the 
content of our moral beliefs across the board.  It causally explains 
why we believe what we do.  Cultural influences obviously fill in 
various details, but these are all variations on deeper, basic themes 
bequeathed by natural selection, as it shaped human moral feeling 
and judgment.  And as noted before, even the cultural influences 
themselves reflect deeper biological ones.  So just as evolutionary 
factors plausibly gave us our basic moral aversion to incest, they 
have had a pervasive influence on all the rest of our moral beliefs 
too.  But then, the argument continues, we have to ask: how would 
natural selection have molded our moral belief-forming 
dispositions?  And the answer is: not specifically to be reliable 
trackers of objective moral truths.  Natural selection rewards traits 
that, over time and in the overall environment, have effects that 
increase the relative frequency in the gene pool of the alleles that 
code for them, by promoting the reproductive success of carriers 
of those alleles.  And this holds for a belief-forming disposition no 
less than for any other trait: human belief-forming dispositions 
were shaped by natural selection to produce whatever beliefs 
promoted the reproductive success of hunter gatherers in ancestral 
environments.  Now in many cases this meant shaping our 
dispositions to form accurate beliefs about the world: for example, 
accurate perceptual beliefs helped our ancestors navigate their 
environment effectively, thus promoting survival, thus promoting 
reproductive success.  But while accurate representation of the 
world comes into the best evolutionary story for our perceptual 
belief-forming dispositions, it needn’t work that way for certain 
other sorts of belief.  
Suppose a genetic variation arose conferring a propensity to 
believe in God, and this led to greater reproductive success because 
believers are more likely to follow social rules even when no fellow 
human is there to enforce them, leading to greater social stability 
and consequent fitness advantages.  This disposition would be 
favored by natural selection quite apart from the truth of the content 
of the beliefs it produces—that is, quite apart from whether those 
beliefs accurately represent a realm of objective theological facts: all 
that matters to the selection story is that having the belief conferred 
an adaptive advantage, which it did quite apart from its truth.  But 
the same thing is true for moral beliefs: if the disposition to form 
certain moral beliefs led to behaviors that enhanced the 
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propagation of the alleles underlying that disposition, then that 
disposition would have been favored by natural selection regardless 
of whether or not those beliefs accurately represented some realm 
of objective or independent moral truths or facts.  Unlike in the 
perceptual case, all that mattered in the moral case, like the religious 
case, was having whatever moral beliefs led (regardless of their truth 
or falsity) to behaviors that maximized the relevant genetic 
propagation.  Fitness-enhancing behavioral dispositions would be 
rewarded regardless of whether they are truly morally right or 
wrong in the philosopher’s sense: philandering or killing step 
children might be rewarded (as they are in other species) no less 
than caring for one’s offspring. And in the same way, fitness-
enhancing dispositions to form moral beliefs will be rewarded 
regardless of whether the beliefs are true or not.  Even if the beliefs 
that philandering is good or that killing stepchildren is permissible 
are false, the disposition to form such beliefs would have been 
rewarded by natural selection if it promoted the relevant genetic 
propagation, no less than the disposition to form plausibly true 
beliefs, like the belief that nurturing one’s children is good. 
The conclusion the debunkers draw from all of this is that our 
confidence in the accuracy of our moral beliefs—just as in the case 
of religious beliefs traceable to evolutionary forces—should 
therefore be undermined.  Or at least that is the case if there are 
objective moral truths, so that our beliefs would have to reliably 
represent those truths to count as accurate.  If our moral beliefs are 
thoroughly molded by evolution, and evolution shaped them 
according to Darwinian principles having nothing to do with 
objective moral truths as such, then we have no reason to think our 
moral beliefs accurately track objective moral properties and truths, 
even if they exist.  It would be sheer luck if they did.  And once we 
realize that, we lose our justification for our moral beliefs, at least 
if moral properties and truths are objective matters.  So either 
moral truths are all reducible to subjective facts about us, or else 
they’re objective but we can’t know them because evolution has 
shaped our moral beliefs completely independently of them, in 
ways we have no reason to think would track them reliably.  That’s 
roughly the evolutionary debunking argument, or the most familiar 
strand of it, though I’m oversimplifying a bit (see FitzPatrick 2014a 
and 2014b for more detailed discussion, and also in connection 
with the response below).  
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7.  Now there are lots of things one might say in response, but my 
central criticism is actually quite simple, given what we have already 
seen.  The problem is that the argument just begs the question 
against the philosophical position it is supposed to be refuting.  It 
is supposed to be showing us that there are no knowable, objective moral 
truths.  And it tries to do that by appealing to science to support 
the claim that the content of our moral beliefs is pervasively shaped 
by evolutionary causal factors, which would have steered our 
beliefs in directions having nothing to do with objective moral 
truths as such.  But the problem is that the science can’t possibly 
establish such a strong explanatory claim about the explanation of 
our moral beliefs. (And it can’t do that with regard to theological 
beliefs either.)  The most that evolutionary biology can do is to 
point to some plausible causal influences in evolutionary history on 
some of our moral beliefs to some extent.  It can’t thereby rule out 
the philosophical possibility I’ve described that many of our moral 
beliefs are instead the result of apprehending moral truths, on the 
model of mathematical beliefs arrived at through understanding 
relevant reasons as such.  So the debunking argument never really 
gets off the ground.  
In other words, the debunkers can’t just start out assuming 
there are no knowable, objective moral truths in an argument 
intended to show that there aren’t any: that would be obviously 
question-begging.  But if there are knowable, objective moral truths 
then it is entirely possible and plausible that many of our moral 
beliefs are properly explained by the fact that we have apprehended 
those truths by understanding the reasons why they’re true, as such.  
For example, I think that is the proper way to explain your belief 
that Talibanic treatment of girls and women is unjust and cruel and 
therefore wrong.  And if that is the case, then it is just false that our 
moral beliefs across the board are simply a result of morally blind 
causal shaping by evolutionary or other cultural forces indifferent to 
moral facts as such.  We can therefore undermine the debunking 
argument from the start by rejecting the first premise, which 
overreaches in its strong explanatory claims about ‘our moral 
beliefs’ across the board.  
The debunkers may be right that insofar as some of our moral 
beliefs reflect nothing but morally blind causal shaping by 
evolutionary or other forces of the sort scientists can study, then 
those beliefs are unreliable.  Evolution would not have shaped us to 
be generally reliable in that way.  But that simply doesn’t matter, 
because we needn’t accept that all our moral beliefs are thoroughly 
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shaped by evolutionary and other blind causal factors.  It is entirely 
possible that in addition to shaping some of our moral beliefs to 
some degree, evolution also gave us the basic raw materials—
reflective, intellectual, and emotional potentialities—necessary for 
us to develop reliable moral belief-forming dispositions ourselves.  
And by developing and deploying those dispositions intelligently, 
we may well have come to have plenty of reliable moral beliefs.  
We don’t need evolution to have made us reliable in tracking 
objective moral truths any more than we need it to have made us 
reliable in tracking truths about non-linear algebra or quantum 
non-locality or philosophy for that matter, none of which played 
any more role in the evolution of Pleistocene human cognitive 
traits than moral truths did.  It is enough if we have been able to 
develop the basic potentialities evolution gave us through the right 
forms of experience, training and reflection in rich cultural 
contexts, in such a way as to come reliably to track moral truths 
through gaining moral understanding.  
 
8.  Let me emphasize in closing that I don’t for a moment claim to 
have shown that there are in fact objective and knowable moral 
truths (though I believe there are).  That is a much larger and more 
difficult question.  My purpose here has been relatively modest: 
namely, to emphasize the live philosophical possibility that there is 
such a thing as getting things objectively right or wrong in morality 
as in other domains (though of course with plenty of room for 
legitimate variation too), and that this possibility of objective moral 
truth reveals potential limitations on certain scientific explanatory 
projects.  It doesn’t affect scientific explanations of how we 
evolved the basic cognitive capacities we use in moral judgment, 
but it does bear on attempts to explain why we believe what we do 
when it comes to the substance of morality: that is, it affects 
explanations of the content of our moral beliefs.  We cannot just 
assume that this can all be done by appeal to the kinds of causal 
factors scientists work with, such as evolutionary influences.  And 
that means that, contrary to that passage from the Economist, it is a 
mistake to think that philosophy needs rescuing by biology in order 
to “explain morality in an intellectually satisfying way.”  Both 
philosophy and the sciences have valuable things to tell us about 
morality, but they are quite different things.  And what is 
“intellectually satisfying” or not when it comes to explanations of 
morality depends partly on the outcome of central ongoing 
 
 
18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 44 [2014], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol44/iss1/2
19 
philosophical debates—debates that will not be settled anytime 
soon, and not by the sciences in any case. 
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